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ABSTRACT
Background: Barendregt proposes a method to deﬁne an input distribu-
tion for a relative risk, as used in the probabilistic sensitivity analysis
(PSA), and suggests the method is “non-Bayesian” and thus does not
require prior knowledge on the probability distribution of the relative
risk.
Aims: To discuss the method from an epistemologically viewpoint.
Materials and Methods: Examination of the underlying assumptions.
Results: The method, like other methods to deﬁne input distributions,
is Bayesian in character and the implied prior distribution is not very
appealing.
Discussion: Bootstrapping offers possibilities to be non-Bayesian, but at
the price of giving only non-Bayesian answers. The method presented by
Barendregt, however, can not be seen as a bootstrapping approach.
Conclusion: Deﬁning the distribution of a RR or any other model param-
eter without being a Bayesian is epistemologically impossible. This means
that being explicit on prior distributions used for deriving those distribu-
tions, and justifying them, is a necessary part of suggesting new ways to
deﬁne distributions.
Keywords: sensitivity analysis, statistics, uncertainty analysis, Bayesian
statistics, bootstrapping.
Barendregt [1] proposes a new method to deﬁne an input distri-
bution for a relative risk (RR), as used in the probabilistic sen-
sitivity analysis (PSA). He suggests his method is non-Bayesian,
and as such does not use subjective, prior information. This
suggestion is also furthered by the use of the term “parametric
bootstrapping” instead of PSA, as bootstrapping is in essence a
non-Bayesian method [2].
Although I sympathize with his goal of making analyses as
objective as possible, and of avoiding the use of subjective infor-
mation, unfortunately, as I will argue in this commentary, such
objectivity is not achieved by the method described. And
although the use of the term “bootstrapping” also implies non-
Bayesian methodology, I do not believe that the term “parametric
bootstrapping” in this context is the right term to use. Parametric
bootstrapping, as I know it, is a method in which, ﬁrst, a para-
metric model is ﬁtted to the data. Then, the ﬁtted model is used
to generate a new set of data (mimicking the original data). In
this context, this would mean that a set of individual patient data
is generated from the ﬁtted relative risk model. After that, the
quantity of interest (e.g., a cost-effectiveness ratio) is calculated
based on the newly generated individual patient data, and this
procedure is repeated many times to obtain a distribution of
cost-effectiveness ratios, which in turn can be used to obtain
non-Bayesian conﬁdence intervals of these cost-effectiveness
ratios. An essential feature of this parametric bootstrapping pro-
cedure is that the RR used is the same during all repeating loops
in the procedure, namely equal to the RR that results from ﬁtting
the model to the original data.
In contrast, in the uncertainty analysis described by Baren-
dregt, a probability distribution for the RRs is deﬁned and used
for drawing different values for the RR from this distribution for
use in the uncertainty analysis. Therefore here, different RRs are
used in different repeating loops of the procedure. It is important
to note that the term “distribution of the RR,” and therefore also
the entire procedure, implies a Bayesian view, as for non-
Bayesians the RR has only a single (although unknown) value, its
true value, which has always a probability of 100%.
The derivation of Barendregt starts with the non-Bayesian
conﬁdence interval of the RR in Equation 4. From this equation,
Equations 5 and 6 are derived as the “natural candidate” for the
distribution of the RR. However, the distribution given in Equa-
tions 5 and 6 can only be derived from the conﬁdence interval in
Equation 4 when one assumes that an x% conﬁdence interval
means that there is x% probability that RR lies in this interval.
This is not the case. An x% conﬁdence interval is not the interval
in which the RR lies with 95% probability; it is an interval with
the property that if one repeats the experiment (or the observa-
tional study) many times, x% of those intervals will contain the
true RR. In other words, the x% is a property of the group of
similarly calculated intervals, and cannot be applied to a particu-
lar individual interval: each individual interval either contains the
true RR or does not contain it.
In order to state the probability that a parameter lies in a
particular interval, one needs information on the prior probabil-
ity of the parameter. An example might clarify this: take the case
where one randomly draws 10 balls (with replacement) from an
urn containing white and black balls, and where the experiment
results in 6 black and 4 white balls. Standard statistical analysis
then delivers a point estimate for the prevalence of black balls of
0.6, with an (exact) 95% conﬁdence interval of 0.26–0.88. Now,
if all possible prevalence rates of black balls are equally likely
(= prior information), the probability that the prevalence is
between 0.26 and 0.88 is indeed 95%. But if one would know
that there are 10 balls in the urn, and that at most two of them
can be black, then it is clear that the probability that the true
prevalence is in the 95% conﬁdence interval from this experi-
ment is zero. Nevertheless, even with this knowledge, the interval
0.26–0.88 from the classical procedure is still a valid (non-
Bayesian) 95% conﬁdence interval. This case is just one of the
unlucky, rare cases where the true value is not contained in the
95% conﬁdence interval. Of course, in this particular example,
the prior knowledge can be used to devise more powerful
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non-Bayesian procedures for this particular situation, only yield-
ing intervals up to 0.2. However, the point I want to make with
the example is that the probability that a parameter is in a
standard conﬁdence interval depends on more than the conﬁ-
dence interval itself: it also depends on a priori knowledge on the
possible value of the parameter one is estimating.
This would not be too bad if there would be a unique way to
deﬁne the prior probability of the parameter under ignorance.
Unfortunately, that is not possible. At ﬁrst sight, the prior
assumption that all prevalence rates are equally likely might seem
to be such a unique prior. However, it is not unique: one could
also propose, for instance, the slightly different assumption that
all odds of white against black balls are equally likely. Therefore,
unambiguous “uninformative” priors do not exist.
The mistake of interpreting an x% conﬁdence interval as
meaning that the parameter value lays in this interval with x%
probability is one that is often made by users of statistics, espe-
cially as the correct interpretation does not seem very useful.
Users are not looking for a statement on repeat performance of a
statistical procedure, but for a statement on the value of a param-
eter, in this case the RR. In the century before the term “Baye-
sian” came into use some 50 years ago [3], this was called the
“inverse probability,” indicating that it gives the probability of
the parameter given the data, rather than the probability of the
data, given the true parameter value. In that time, it was already
widely recognized [4] that it is impossible to estimate this prob-
ability from data or objective facts only, but that this can only be
done after making assumptions on the probability of different
parameter values “under ignorance” [2–4]. In modern terms, in
order to derive a probability distribution for a RR from data, one
needs a prior probability distribution for the RR. There is no
non-Bayesian way around this. Non-Bayesians basically solve
the problem by declaring it inadmissible, as parameters like a
relative risk for them only have an unknown true value, not a
distribution.
So the new correction method proposed by Barendregt in his
Equations 12 and 13 is based on the Bayesian notion that a
parameter has a distribution, and thus his method unavoidably
places an implicit prior distribution on the RR. The question is:
is this implicit prior reasonable? If I reason back from the pos-
terior distribution deﬁned in Equations 12 and 13 to the prior
behind it, then I ﬁnd a prior that places the lowest probability on
the observed RR, and higher probabilities on RR values farther
removed from the observed RR. This does not seem a very
sensible prior to me, and therefore I would not use the distribu-
tion deﬁned by Equations 12 and 13.
If one would want to carry out a non-Bayesian uncertainty
analysis, bootstrapping would be an option. In the example
given, it is possible to do parametric bootstrapping by sampling
case and controls from a Poisson-distribution with an expecta-
tion of 20 and 40 cases, respectively. In this simple example,
the parametric bootstrapping would yield results equal to that
of nonparametric bootstrapping (presuming that the real data
are generated by a Poisson-process). Nonparametric bootstrap-
ping is cited by Barendregt as the golden standard for uncer-
tainty analysis. Such an approach yields an average RR of
0.513, closer to the average of 0.519 when using the distribu-
tion from Equations 5 and 6, than to the “desirable” point
estimate of 0.5.
A disadvantage, in my opinion, of the bootstrap approach is
that it only delivers a (non-Bayesian) conﬁdence interval on the
cost-effectiveness ratio (or any other outcome) that can only be
interpreted as an interval that contain the true value with a
particular frequency, but not as a statement on the probability of
a particular cost-effectiveness ratio. A Bayesian conﬁdence (cred-
ibility) interval, on the other hand, has a much wider usefulness,
and can be used, for instance, in value-of-information analysis
[5,6].
Apart from these epistemological objections, the reasoning
behind the proposed method does not convince me. Barendregt
lists as desirable properties for the distribution to be used:
1. The type of distribution is based on the kind of variable,
and the way the point estimate and conﬁdence interval was
obtained.
2. The distribution returns a mean that is equal to the point
estimate.
3. The distribution returns an uncertainty interval that repli-
cates the conﬁdence interval of the point estimate.
As justiﬁcation for the latter two criteria, he refers to consis-
tency of the point estimate and the results from the uncertainty
analysis, and to “neither under- nor over-representing the uncer-
tainty implied by the conﬁdence interval.” I agree with his ﬁrst
desirable, but the arguments given for the last two desirables
elude me. Both point estimate and conﬁdence interval are theo-
retical constructs in the context of a particular statistical analysis
rather than the truth that needs to be exactly reproduced.
A minor comment on the method is that Barendregt states in
the discussion that his second method returns an uncertainty
interval with a width that replicates the width of the conﬁdence
interval of the original point estimate. This strictly spoken can
not be true, as the method (Equations 12 and 13) delivers a
lognormal distribution with equal variance to the variance of the
original lognormal distribution (Equations 5 and 6). As the
shapes of both distributions differ, this implies unequal width of
for instance the 95% conﬁdence intervals. In the example given
by Barendregt, the difference is small, but its existence can be
illustrated with a more extreme example (2 and 4 cases, instead
of 20 and 40). Here, the 95% conﬁdence interval from Equations
5/6 would have been 0.09–2.73 (a width of 2.64), while the
second correction method from Equations 12/13 would yield a
conﬁdence interval of 0.03–2.36, a width of 2.33.
In summary, deﬁning the distribution of a RR or any other
model parameter without being a Bayesian is epistemologically
impossible. This means that being explicit on prior distributions
used for deriving those distributions, and justifying them, is a
necessary part of suggesting new ways to derive distributions.
Bootstrapping offers possibilities to be non-Bayesian, but at the
price of giving only non-Bayesian answers. The method pre-
sented by Barendregt, however, cannot be seen as a bootstrap-
ping approach.
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